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ABSTRACT:
In a hold-up experiment designed to test theoretical predictions following from
Hart (1995) and deMeza/Lockwood (1998) regarding investment behavior
Sonnemans et al. (2001) (SOS) find only a partial confirmation of theory.
According to SOS these deviations from standard theory can be explained by
positive reciprocal behavior. In this paper, we replicate the experiment by SOS
and add another group of treatments in which asset ownership is endogenized
by auctioning off the assets. Our experiment shows that the results by SOS
crucially depend on the ownership structure being exogenously assigned
by the experimenter. We present experimental evidence that, by and large,
corroborates the theoretical predictions made by Hart (1995).
Keywords: property rights, hold-up, experiment, endogenous ownership
structure
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1. INTRODUCTION
Grossman/Hart (1986), Hart/Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) (in the following abbre-
viated by ”GHM”) develop a theory of the firm in which owning more assets increases
the investor’s incentives to make specific investments in his human capital. The reason
for this is that owning more assets increases the marginal productivity of investment
in the no-trade case. This, in turn, strengthens the investor’s bargaining position at the
renegotiation stage. The investor will accordingly invest more at the investment stage
when he owns more assets than when he owns less. To turn the argument on its head,
it means investment incentives do not change when owning more assets does not raise
the investment’s marginal productivity in the no-trade payoff.
In an experimental investigation of the theoretical predicitions following from GHM
and deMeza/Lockwood (1998) Sonnemans et al. (2001) (SOS) report on a finding that
conflicts with this theoretical prediction. In their so-called TP-game (threat-point) they
distinguish three different no-trade payoffs of the investor: low, intermediate and high
where higher no-trade payoffs reflect ownership of more assets. Because no-trade pay-
offs are independent of investments the ownership structure theoretically does not af-
fect investment incentives and accordingly investment levels.
In contrast to that theoretical prediction SOS find that, firstly, ”average investment
levels are below the socially efficient level [...] [but] always above the level predicted
by subgame perfection” (2001, result 2, p. 805), secondly, that ”average investment
levels increase when the no-trade pay-off increases” (2001, result 1, p. 803) and finally,
that ”the impact of M1’s no-trade pay-off on first and finally agreed offers is smaller
than predicted” (2001, result 5, p. 810). Taking into account the bargaining behav-
ior they point to positive reciprocal behavior as the driving force behind their result 2
(2001, p. 816): ”Investments above the equilibrium level can be interpreted by the non-
investor as fair behavior of the investor. This friendly behavior of the investor warrants
a reward in the form of a larger return on the investment than predicted by subgame
perfection. Investors anticipate this and therefore invest more than predicted. This
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explains why [...] actual investment levels exceed predicted investment levels.” Unfor-
tunately, they do not discuss possible reasons for the increase of average investment
levels when no-trade payoffs increase.
This paper reports on an experiment that adds an auction stage to the TP-game of
SOS in which the ownership rights are auctioned off rather than assigned by the inves-
tigator. Thus, the distribution of ownership rights becomes an endogenous variable.
The paper aims to test whether SOS’s results regarding investment and bargaining be-
havior still hold with this experimental modification.
Hoffman/Spitzer (1982), Hoffman/Spitzer (1985) and Hoffman et al. (1994) have
shown that endogenizing positions in ultimatum games by carrying out a knowledge
competition among the participants led to results that are by far closer to subgame per-
fectness than games without endogenous positions. In a similar way, we hypothesize
that making the distribution of ownership rights endogenous leads to a corrobora-
tion of theoretical equilibrium predictions based on subgame perfectness. Such a shift,
however, should be taken very seriously because endogenous ownership structures
are certainly closer to real world business where ownership rights have to be earned
or bought.
There are several other experimental studies of the hold up problem. Hackett (1993)
and Hackett (1994) study a hold up experiment with bilateral specific investments.
Hackett finds a similar result of underinvestment with reference to socially optimal
investment and overinvestment with reference to equilibrium predictions. Hackett
shows that investing over equilibrium predictions is more pronounced if investments
are observable than if they are not. Sloof et al. (2001b) is closely related to SOS. In con-
trast to SOS, no-trade payoffs are given to the non-investing party. Again, investments
are above equilibrium predictions but below the social optimum. Sloof et al. (2000) and
Sloof et al. (2001a) analyze the effect of different contract clauses (damage payments) in
different hold up settings. Olcina et al. (2000) analyze bilateral specific investments as
a coordination game. Koenigstein (2001) carries out a hold up experiment with bilat-
eral specific investments and a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game. Both papers do not
find any underinvestment problem (with reference to the social optimum)! However,
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none of the above experimental studies focusses on our main object of analysis, i.e. the
impact of endogenizing property rights.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the simplified version of Hart’s
(1995) model that we use for our experiment. Section 3 describes the experimental
design and formulates the hypotheses. In section 4 we present and discuss our results.
In Section 5 we draw some conclusions.
2. THEORY
We use a simplified version of Hart’s (1995) model: There are two managers (M1
and M2) operating two assets (a1 and a2). With the aid of a2 M2 produces one unit of
an intermediate product that M1 processes to a final good using a1. The sequence of
actions is as follows: In t = 0 M1 and M2 choose an ownership structure. In t = 1 M1
can make a specific investment which increases M1’s revenue of selling the final good.
Uncertainty about the precise type of the intermediate product M1 needs is resolved in
t = 2. In t = 3 M1 and M2 bargain over the price of the intermediate product. In t = 4
trade occurs and the payoffs are realized (cf. Fig. 1).
FIGURE 1. Timeline
t
Ownership Investment Uncertainty Renegotiation Payoffs
0 1 2 3 4
Like Hart (1995) we distinguish three basic ownership structures: Non-integration
(type-0) where M1 owns a1 and M2 owns a2, M1-integration (type-1) where M1 owns
both a1 and a2, and M2-integration (type-2) where M2 owns both assets. Formally the
ownership structure is represented by Aj, j = 1, 2, where Aj denotes the set of assets j
owns. For example, A1 = {a1, a2} and A2 = ∅ denote the M1-integration.
M1’s investment is denoted by i and represents both the level and the cost of in-
vestment. It is completely relation-specific, i.e. it has no value when trading with
an outsider. When M1 and M2 agree to trade M1’s revenue is R(i) (with R′(i) > 0
and R′′(i) < 0). M1’s ex post payoff amounts to R(i) − p where p denotes the
3
agreed upon price M1 pays for the intermediate product. M1’s ex ante payoff is there-
fore R(i) − p − i. When M1 and M2 agree not to trade M1’s revenue is r(A1) with
r(a1, a2) ≥ r(a1) ≥ r(∅). M1’s ex post payoff in this case is r(A1)− ps where ps is the
spot market price for a general purpose intermediate product.
In case of trading with M1 M2’s production costs equal C; hence his ex post and
ex ante payoff is p− C. When trade does not occur M2’s production costs amount to
c(A2) with c(a1, a2) ≤ c(a2) ≤ c(∅). His ex ante payoff then equals ps − c(A2).
Hence, the ex post surplus equals R(i) − C when trade occurs and r(A1) − c(A2)
when trade does not occur. The specifity of investment i is formalized by assuming
that the ex post surplus in case of trade always exceeds the ex post surplus in case of
no trade: R(i)−C > r(A1)− c(A2), for all i, A1 and A2.1 Given these assumptions the
first-best level of investment i∗ satisfies R′(i∗) = 1. In general, this first-best level of
investment is not achieved because M1 when choosing his investment level takes into
account that she will loose part of the investment returns when bargaining with M2
over p in t = 3. Therefore her incentives to invest are not first-best.
Following Hart (1995) M1 and M2 share the ”Nash-cake”, i.e. the ex post gains
from trade (R(i)− C − (r(A1)− c(A2)), equally. In t = 4 M1 and M2 receive payoffs
according to the Nash-bargaining solution. This is each actor’s no-trade payoff plus
one half of the Nash-cake, ri(Ai) + 12 [(R(i)− C)− (r(A1)− c(A2))]. In other words,
both parties get their no-trade payoffs plus one half of the remaining surplus. M1’s ex
ante payoff therefore amounts to
pi1 = r(A1)− ps + 12
[
R(i)− C− (r(A1)− c(A2))
]− i
= −ps + 1
2
[
R(i)− C+ r(A1) + c(A2)
]− i




Given the strict concavity of R(i) it follows that investment levels are below the
efficient investment level and are independent of the underlying integration form:
1The basic GHM-model has a much broader scope: Both M1 and M2 invest, the no-trade payoffs
depend on the investment-levels, and specifity also applies in a marginal sense (cf. Hart, 1995).
4
i∗ > i1 = i0 = i2 (subscripts denote integration forms).2 Accordingly, as ownership
does not have any effect on investment incentives the integration form does not matter
from a social efficiency point of view.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
Our design covers 2× 3 treatments, corresponding to two methods of allocating the
no-trade payoffs and three no-trade payoff levels. The so-called basic treatment repli-
cates SOS’s TP-game in which the no-trade payoffs are assigned by the investigator. In
the auction treatment the no-trade payoffs are auctioned off. In each single session only
one allocation treatment was considered. We ran two sessions per allocation treat-
ment, so that we had four sessions in total. Overall 78 subjects participated in the
experiment: two sessions with 20 subjects and two sessions with 18 subjects with 38
subjects per allocation treatment. The subject pool was mainly the student population
of Clausthal University of Technology and some highschool students of the Robert-
Koch-Gymnasium Clausthal. They earned on average 26.48e (about 30.45$) in about
three hours.
In the following subsection we describe the basic setup of each experimental session.
Subsequently we describe how the bargaining, investment and auction stages were
framed and presented to the subjects. Finally, we present the hypotheses that result
from our parameter choices.
3.1. Basic Setup of a Session. Each session comprised 18 periods. Each single period
consisted of a single play of a two-stage game in the basic treatment or a three-stage
game in the auction treatment (cf. Tab. 1).
TABLE 1. Setup of treatments
Stage 1 Stage 2
basic treatment investment bargaining
auction treatment auctions investment bargaining
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
2The strict equalities result from the fact that r(A1) does not depend on i.
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The first stage of the auction treatment consisted of two successive english auctions
in which one subject with the role of M1 and one subject with the role of M2 could
bid for combinations of no-trade payoffs. The last two stages of both treatments are
essentially the same. Moreover, they replicate the setup of SOS’s TP-game: In the
second-to-last stage the M1-subjects choose an investment level; in the last stage a
M1 and a M2-subject bargain over the division of the surplus. In total, all subjects
played 18 periods. One half of the subjects was assigned the role of M1, the other half
was assigned the role of M2. Each participant kept this role for the whole session.
These roles were communicated to the subjects after they had read and understood
the complete instructions. In each single period, all M1s were grouped anonymously
with a different M2. Using two different rotating schemes we ensured that the same
subjects were not matched more than once during the first nine periods and during the
last nine periods. The subjects were explicitly informed about this grouping procedure.
This procedure guaranteed as few reputation effects as possible.3
The experiment was computerized.4 It was programmed and conducted with the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). First, subjects had to read the instructions, and
subsequently they had to answer some questions correctly before the experiment
started. For example, the subjects had to calculate the earnings of M1 and M2 in some
hypothetical settings. Additionally, all subjects received a summary of the instructions
on paper. Both, the instructions and the experiment were phrased as neutrally as pos-
sible. At the beginning of period one, all subjects were communicated their respective
role for the whole session. After having played the 18 games the subjects completed
a questionnaire asking for their gender, their previous education related to economics
and their profession. Thereafter experimental points were exchanged for money and
subjects were paid individually and discretely.
To make our experiment directly comparable to the experiment of SOS we chose
the same functional forms and values: The linear form of the revenue function was
3In the first session a programming mistake had slipped in: In the last nine periods there were eleven
out of eighty-one cases where two subjects were grouped that had been grouped before. However, this
should not give cause for concern because subjects could not expect that this would happen and did not
know that it happened.
4The experiments took place in the EXECUTE-lab (Experimental Economics Clausthal University of
Technology). Subjects are separated by cubicles and do not know with whom they are grouped.
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R(i) = V + 10i with V = 10, 000.5 The cost of investment was quadratic in i ∈
{0, 10, 20, ..., 1, 000}: h(i) = i2100 . Furthermore, we chose M1’s no-trade payoffs to be
r(∅) = 1, 800, r(a1) = 6, 800, and r(a1, a2) = 7, 800, respectively. We normalized
the price for the intermediate product on the spot market as well as M2’s production
cost both inside and outside the relationship to zero: C = cj = ps = 0, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Given these functions the first-best level of investment is i∗ = 500. In subgame perfect
equilibrium M1 chooses an investment level of ij = 250 irrespective of the underly-
ing ownership structure j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. As in SOS both the level of the no-trade payoffs
and the base amount V do not affect investment incentives. Therefore, all ownership
structures are equivalent from an efficiency point of view.
The exchange ratewas 1e for 7,500 experimental points. At the time the experiments
were conducted 1 e was about 1.15 US-$ so that 1 US-$ corresponded to about 6,500
points.
In the basic treatment all values of the no-trade payoffs were considered within one
session. In both sessions no-trade payoffs were ordered equally over the 18 periods.
The subjects were told that each of the three values had a chance of 13 of being chosen in
each period, but they did not know the ordering itself. At the beginning of each period,
they were informed about the value of r in that period. All pairs were confronted with
the same value of r in each single period. The fixed sequence of rs used was equal to
that in SOS.
In the auction treatment subjects had to bid for the no-trade payoffs that applied in
that period in two successive English auctions. The status quo was r = 1, 800 with r
raising to r = 6, 800 when both M1 and M2 won exactly one auction or to r = 7, 800
when M1 won both auctions. Accordingly, the values of r could differ between groups
within one period and were not evenly spread over the eighteen periods.
Finally we endowed all subjects with an initial stock of experimental points. In the
basic treatment subjects with the role of M1 got an initial endowment of 10,000 points
5SOS chose the linear form to be R(i) = V + v · i with V = 10, 000+ r and v = 100. They added r
to the base amount of 10,000 to make their TP-game comparable to their OO-game. Firstly, this was not
necessary for us as we did not consider outside options. Secondly, and more important, V = 10, 000+ r
would have destroyed any incentive for M2 to bid for ownership-rights: As r is defined as the no-trade
payoff of M1 any variation in r would have cancelled out with regard to the equilibrium bargaining
outcome. Finally, investment incentives are not affected by these differences.
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(1.54 US-$) and subjects with the role of M2 got an initial endowment of 60,000 points
(9.23 US-$). This corresponds exactly to the initial endowments with SOS. In the auc-
tion treatment subjects with the role of M1 got an initial endowment of 20,000 points
and subjects with the role of M2 got an initial endowment of 70,000 points. We chose
different initial endowments for the two treatments mainly for one reason: In the auc-
tion treatment M1s could spend up to 10,000 points in the auctions. To avoid a bias
in investment behavior because of an immediate debt at the investment stage we en-
dowed M1s with additional 10,000 points. To preserve the relation between M1s’ and
M2s’ endowments we added 10,000 points to M2s’ initial endowments as well. All
subjects received a show-up fee amounting to 10 e (about 11.5 US-$).
3.2. Framing of the Bargaining, the Investment and the Auction Stage. In both treat-
ments the bargaining stage corresponds exactly to the bargaining stage of SOS’s TP-
game: We used an alternating offer structure with exactly ten bargaining rounds. In
each round one round-pie was negotiated betweenM1 andM2. The size of each round-
pie was 110R(i). M1 andM2 alternated inmaking offers of the division of the ten round-
pies with M2 starting in round 1. When the responder accepted an offer all remaining
round-pies were automatically divided according to the accepted offer. If, for example,
M2 accepted an offer in round 4, all seven round-pies from round 4 to 10 were divided
according to that accepted offer. In case an offer was rejected the round-pie of that
round got lost and the players received one tenth of their respective no-trade payoffs,
i.e. r(A1)/10 and zero. In case agreement was not reached at all – M2 rejected M1’s
offer in round 10 – the last round-pie also got lost and the bargaining ended with both
players receiving only their no-trade payoffs.
The framing of the investment stage in the basic treatment corresponds exactly to
that of SOS’s TP-game: At the beginning of each period, M1 and M2 were informed
about the size of the base round-pie and the value of the no-trade payoff. The size of the
base round-pie equalled 1,000 experimental points. Subsequently, M1 decided on how
much she wanted to add to the base round-pie. Thus, M1 could choose any investment
level between 0, 10, 20, 30, ..., 1,000. Both M1 and M2 could read the investment costs
incurred by M1 resulting from her investment decision from a table that had been
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handed out to both M1 and M2 together with the summary of instructions before the
start of the experiment. The size of the actual round pies was accordingly the sum of
the base-round pie plus the amount M1 chose, i.e. V/10+ i. The game then continued
to the second stage in which the two subjects bargained over the division of the ten
actual round pies, as described above. The framing of the investment stage in the
auction treatment differed only slightly from that in the basic treatment: M1 and M2
already knew the size of the no-trade payoffs from the auction stage. Accordingly, they
were just informed about the size of the base round-pie.
Finally, the auction stage in the auction treatment consisted of two successive English
auctions with a time limit after which the current highest offer was chosen. In these
auctions the actual no-trade payoffs for that period were determined. When M1 won
both auctions her no-trade payoff was 7,800 points and M2’s no-trade payoff was 0,
when M1 won one auction and M2 the other one M1’s no-trade payoff was 6,800 and
M2’s 0, and finally, when M2 won both auctions M1’s no-trade payoff was 1,800 and
M2’s 0. Thence, M2’s interest in buying assets consisted solely in weakening M1’s
bargaining position. To summarize, three different combinations of no-trade payoffs
could be realized (cf. Tab. 2).
TABLE 2. No-Trade Payoffs
Combination X Y Z
M1’s no-trade payoff 1,800 6,800 7,800









The game in the auction treatment then continued to the second stage in which M1
decided on how much to add to the base round-pie.
3.3. Hypotheses. We present our hypotheses related to the basic treatment in view
of the results of SOS. With regard to the auction treatment we draw parallels to the
experiences of Hoffman/Spitzer (1982), Hoffman/Spitzer (1985) and Hoffman et al.
(1994) who show that entitlements to a position in experiments may lead to behavior
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that is closer to equilibrium. Therefore, wemake predictions based on subgame perfect
equilibrium. These hypotheses are summarized in Table 3. We formulate hypotheses
both in terms of qualitative predictions and in terms of point predictions. In particular,
we test the following hypotheses regarding investment and bargaining behavior:6
Investment behavior
• In the basic treatment average investment levels are below the socially efficient
level but above the subgame perfect level.
• In the basic treatment average investment levels increase with increasing no-
trade payoffs.
• In the auction treatment average investment levels are independent of the value
of the no-trade payoff.
• In the auction treatment average investment levels equal 250 for all r.
Bargaining behavior
• In the basic treatment M1’s share of the Nash-cake, i.e. his ’Nash-share’, shrinks
with increasing no-trade payoffs.
• In the basic treatment agreement is not immediate.
• In the auction treatmentM1’s share of theNash-cake is independent of the value
of r.
• In the auction treatment M1’s share of the Nash-cake is 50%.
• In the auction treatment agreement is immediate.
4. RESULTS
In this section we work through the results of Sonnemans et al. (2001) and test
whether our basic treatment replicates their results of the TP game and whether our
auction treatment leads to significant differences to our basic treatment and to their
results. We proceed as follows: The first four results present our findings on invest-
ment behavior, results 5 to 9 are related to bargaining behavior and results 10 and 11
6The bidding behavior will be the topic of another paper. In this paper the auctions are of interest
only inasmuch they help making the ownership structure an endogenous part of the parties’ decisions.
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TABLE 3. Hypotheses
Basic Treatment Auction Treatment
Investment stage Investment 250 < i < 500 i = 250
i increases with r i independent of r
Bargaining stage Outcome M1’s share decreases 12 (1, 000+ i+ r/10)
with r independent of r
Agreement not immediate immediate
Remark: The socially efficient investment level amounts to 500. The bargaining out-
come is given as the share of M1, i.e. his round revenues according to the bargaining
agreement.
are again related to investment behavior taking into account the results of bargaining
behavior.
Result 1. In the basic treatment mean investment levels increase with r, i.e. control over more
assets induces higher investments.
Result 1 corresponds perfectly to SOS’s result 1 (2001, 803). Table 4 shows mean
investment levels in the different treatments. Obviously, average investments are in-
creasing in r. Pairs of superscripts (c, d, e, and f) show that differences in investments
are significant whenever we compare the investment levels of different r-values with
each other. Table 4 also shows that all significant differences perfectly coincide with
those of Sonnemans et al. (2001, Table 2).
Result 2. In the auction treatment average investments do not increase in r. This means the
ownership structure does not influence investment behavior significantly.
Result 2 stands in contrast to Result 1. Obviously, the introduction of endogenizing
the ownership allocation by an auction changes the nature of investment behavior in
a way such that the ownership structure (r) looses its impact on investments. Table
4 shows that there are, of course, some differences in average investments. However,
these differences are not monotonically increasing in r. In contrast, during periods 1
through 9 investments at r = 6, 800 are above those at r = 7, 800 which is rather sur-
prising. Furthermore, in the second half, there is just one single significant difference
in investments at the 5% level, namely the difference between investments at r = 1, 800
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TABLE 4. Comparison of mean investment levels
Mean Investment Levels
Periods Sonnemans et al. Basic Treatment Auction Treatment
All 1,800 cd309ab cd238∗a c(d)251∗b
6,800 ce392b ce370T c300bT
7,800 de435b de417T (d)262∗bT
First half 1,800 [324]b cd288∗ cd248∗b
(1-9) 6,800 [377]b ce390T c304bT
7,800 [470]b de461T d215∗bT
Second half 1,800 cd294a cd188aT c255∗T
(10-18) 6,800 c407ab c350a(T) c294b(T)
7,800 d400b d374T 294∗bT
Final three 1,800 cd303a cd184a 280∗
(16-18) 6,800 c401(a)b c332(a) 282∗b
7,800 d415b d353 292∗b
The subgame perfect investment level is 250 in all treatments. Mean investment levels
in square brackets (first half of mean investment levels from SOS) have been deduced
from the mean investment levels of all periods and the second half. Left pairs of super-
scripts indicate significant differences (5%) within the same column and time horizon.
Right pairs of subscripts indicate significant differences within the same row across
treatments. Asterisks indicate that we cannot reject 250 being the mean of our corre-
sponding subsamples at a 5%-level of significance using t-tests. Super- or subscripts in
brackets are only significant at the level of 10%. Left superscripts have been derived
by Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for matched pairs. Right subscripts for the basic treatment
and the auction treatment have been derived by Mann-Whitney U-tests. The ”a” and
”b” subscripts show the results of t-tests whethermean investments in Sonnemans et al.
(2001) can be rejected as the mean of our corresponding investment subsample.
and r = 6, 800. This significance, however, disappears during periods 16 through 18.
This is perfectly in line with the predictions of standard subgame perfect Nash Equilib-
rium. We explain different behavior in earlier and later periods with learning processes
which seem to converge towards the equilibrium.
Result 3. In the basic treatment average investment levels are below the socially optimal level
of i∗ = 500. If r = 1, 800 then investments are near to or below the equilibrium level and if
r 6= 1, 800 investments are above the equilibrium level.
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Table 4 shows this quite clearly. Analyzed for all periods, at r = 1, 800 investments
are close to the equilibrium value (iNE = 250) with the difference not being signifi-
cant, i.e. we cannot reject 250 being the mean of our corresponding subsamples. In the
second half of the periods investments are significantly below 250 which clearly contra-
dicts SOS’s result. In cases of r 6= 1, 800, however, investments are significantly above
the equilibrium level. This confirms SOS’s results. The deviation in case of r = 1, 800
can, however, partly be explained by a considerable difference in investment levels
between SOS’s and our experiment. Table 4 shows that virtually all investments in
our basic treatment are below those of SOS. Some of them are significant, others are
not. We conclude from this that subjects in our experiment were more reluctant to in-
vest than the dutch students. It is, however, not clear to us why this is so much more
pronounced at r = 1, 800. Despite these differences we think that our basic treatment
replicates the investment behavior by SOS quite well.
Result 4. In the auction treatment average investments are
• well under the socially optimal level,
• closer to subgame perfect equilibrium predictions than in the basic treatment, and
• most times only insignificantly different from subgame perfect investments.
Analyzing the cases of r = 6, 800 and r = 7, 800 the overall impression from Table
4 is that investments in the auction treatment are lower than those in the basic treat-
ment. The difference is significant for all periods as well as for periods 10 through 18.
In case of r = 1, 800 the average investment level in the auction treatment is signif-
icantly higher than in the basic treatment only in the second half of the experiment.
Thus, our first major insight is that investment behavior in the auction treatment dif-
fers substantially from investment behavior in the basic treatment. With endogenous
ownership structures investments move towards the equilibrium prediction.
It is somewhat even more remarkable how close average investments in the auction
treatment are to the subgame perfect equilibrium. In cases of r = 1, 800 and r = 7, 800
average investments are not significantly different from 250, i.e. we cannot reject 250
being the mean of our corresponding subsamples. This is also true for the last three
periods and r = 6, 800. Taking into account all periods (and the complete second half
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of the periods), however, in case of r = 6, 800 average investments are significantly
above the equilibrium prediction. We now turn to the bargaining behavior.
Result 5. In the basic treatment finally agreed offers, i.e. the amount the investor M1 gets each
round in the bargaining game, are in between the equilibrium values of the Outside Option
bargaining game (DMO-solution) and the equilibrium of our bargaining game (NB-solution).
Finally agreed offers are closer to the equilibrium of our bargaining game.
SOS compare two treatments of the hold up-experiment which differ with respect to
their bargaining game. In one treatment they implement an outside option bargaining
game. The equilibrium of this game is characterized by an equal split of the whole
ex post surplus if the outside option of the investor is smaller than 50% of the whole
surplus. Otherwise the investor only gets his outside option value (”deal me out”). In
our bargaining game we implemented SOS’s TP-game which has the Nash bargain-
ing solution as a unique equilibrium. In our basic treatment finally agreed offers are
on average 37.45 points below the Nash bargaining solution and 194.97 points above
the equilibrium of the Outside Option bargaining game. Accordingly, result 5 is com-
pletely in line with the results of SOS.
Result 6. In our auction treatment the average value of finally agreed offers (that the investor
(M1) receives) is above both the average DMO-solution and the average NB-solution. Further-
more, finally agreed offers are close to the NB-solution.
As before, we calculated the difference between the theoretical solutions and finally
agreed offers. It shows that finally agreed offers are on average 12.57 points above
the NB-solution and 240.46 points above the DMO-solutions. Both deviations from
the equilibrium values are significant. The average deviation of 12.57, however, is
rather small in absolute terms. This means that bargaining in the auction treatment
is different from bargaining in the auction treatment. Our overall conclusion is that
with regard to the distribution of surplus the subgame perfect equilibrium is quite a
good – though not perfectly precise – predictor of bargaining behavior in our auction
treatment.
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TABLE 5. Accepted distribution of period payoffs
Mean Investor’s Share
Basic Treatment Auction Treatment
r Surplus-share Nash-share Surplus-share Nash-share
1,800 ab60.22 ab53.26 ab58.93 51.80∗
6,800 ac68.69s a35.97n ac77.17s 50.80∗n
7,800 bc73.32s b38.42n bc81.96s 49.36∗n
All 67.36 42.55 74.22 50.66∗
Surplus-share and Nash-share in percent. Left pairs of superscripts indicate significant
differences (1%) within the same column. Right pairs of subscripts indicate signifi-
cant differences (1%) within the same row across treatments. Asterisks indicate that
we cannot reject 50 being the mean of our corresponding subsamples at a 5%-level of
significance using t-tests.
Table 5 gives further information about the agreed distributions of profits. The
surplus-share describes the share (percentage) that the investor gets from total surplus
(gross of investment costs). The ”Nash-cake” consists of total surplus minus no-trade
payoffs, i.e. the additional amount of money that the negotiators can realize if they
reach an agreement. Nash-share then describes the percentage of the ”Nash-cake” that
the investor gets in each round after agreement. Subgame perfection predicts that the
Nash-share should always be 50%. Table 5 shows that the surplus-share is always
above 50%, i.e. the DMO-solution if the outside option is not binding. It is also evident
that the investor’s average share is smaller if r = 1, 800 and larger otherwise.
All average Nash-shares in the basic treatment are significantly different from 50, the
equilibrium prediction. In the auction treatment, however, all average Nash-shares are
not significantly different from 50%, i.e. we cannot reject 50 being the average of our
corresponding Nash-share subsamples. Most times within the basic treatment surplus-
and Nash-shares vary with the ownership structure (r). Again, this effect completely
vanishes within the auction treatment with respect to the Nash-shares.
A comparison of the basic and the auction treatment shows that surplus- and Nash-
shares differ significantly at r = 6, 800 and r = 7, 800 but not at r = 1, 800. Asymmetric
(theoretical) bargaining power thus is much more effective within the auction treat-
ment. It seems as if fairness or reciprocity considerations play a larger role within
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TABLE 6. Regression results explaining the finally agreed offers M1 re-
ceives in the basic treatment
V i r period n Adj. R2
0.4796 0.6478 0.2649 6.3329 329 0.76
(0.017)# (0.028)# (0.022)# (1.058)#
Standard errors in parentheses. Marks ”#” indicate a significance at the 1%-level.
the basic treatment but only a minor role within the auction treatment where higher
bargaining power due to higher no-trade payoffs is exploited much better.
Result 7. In the basic treatment
(1) finally agreed offers give the investor a larger return on investment than theory predicts
and
(2) the impact of the ownership structure (r) on finally agreed offers is smaller than theory
predicts.
Subgame perfectness predicts that finally agreed offers (FAO) increase with r and
with investments (i). In each case the investors profit should increase by 0.5 times
the increase in investment and r, respectively. To test this prediction we estimated the
equation FAO = β0V + β1i + β2r + β3period+ e with V = 1, 000. The results of this
estimation are given in Table 6.
The estimated coefficient of i is larger than 0.5, the coefficient of r is smaller than 0.5.
All coefficients are significantly different from zero. Both differences to 0.5 are signif-
icant at the 1%-level, too. This means that investment returns are higher than theory
predicts and that the effects of asset allocation are weaker. These results are perfectly
in line with SOS.7 Sonnemans et al. (2001, p. 812) explain this divergence from the-
ory with reciprocity. Reciprocity means that players want to punish other players who
have acted in an unfriendly way and they want to reward players who acted cooper-
atively or generously. Translated to hold up-experiments this means that investments
are interpreted as a friendly action that induces a reward by M2. Furthermore, they
7SOS also analyze the amounts M1 would get from M2’s first offers. We do not discuss the details of
this question. In our experiment, however, results are similar both to SOS’s results and to the analysis
of finally agreed offers.
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TABLE 7. Regression results explaining the finally agreed offers in the
auction treatment
V i r period n Adj. R2
0.4538 0.6442 0.4646 4.100 329 0.67
(0.023)# (0.033)# (0.030)# (1.293)#
Standard errors in parentheses. Marks ”#” indicate a significance at the 1%-level.
explain that in many bargaining experiments deviations towards an equal split are
common. This explains why the effect of r is smaller than theoretically predicted.
Result 8. In the auction treatment
(1) finally agreed offers give the investor a larger return on investment than predicted and
(2) the impact of M1’s no-trade payoff (r) on finally agreed offers is close to theoretical
predictions.
For a sensible comparison of our treatments, we estimated the same regression equa-
tion with respect to finally agreed offers in the auction treatment. Results are given in
Table 7.
Again, all estimated coefficients are significant at the 1%-level. As above, the in-
vestment coefficient is significantly above 0.5 and of nearly the same magnitude as the
corresponding value in the basic treatment. Consequently, investments still give larger
returns than theory predicts and reciprocity may be one plausible explanation.
This is, however, different for the r-coefficient. Here the value is clearly higher than
in the basic treatment and a t-test shows that the new coefficient is not significantly dif-
ferent from 0.5 any more. Above, we mentioned that in bargaining experiments there
is often a deviation from theory towards a more equal distribution of payoffs which
could explain the low r-coefficient within the basic treatment. This, however, seems
to be rather irrelevant in the auction treatment. There does not seem to be a signifi-
cant deviation of bargaining behavior from theory. The aspect of equality of payoffs
seems to have lost its impact on bargaining behavior after subjects have ”earned” their
bargaining position by winning an auction.
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TABLE 8. Average Lengths of the Bargaining Processes
SOS Basic Treatment Auction Treatment
periods periods periods periods periods periods
r 1-9 10-18 1-9 10-18 1-9 10-18
1,800 2.68a m2.06a 2.89 2.78 3.45 n3.43
6,800 2.40 m2.57 2.96 3.09 3.26 (p)3.68
7,800 2.45 2.22 3.27 3.04 3.58 n(p)2.90
Left pairs of superscripts indicate significant differences (5%) within the same column.
Right pairs of subscripts indicate significant differences within the same row across
treatments. Super- or subscripts in brackets are only significant at the 10%-level.
Result 9. In both treatments bargaining is not efficient because agreement is not reached im-
mediately. Furthermore, the average length of bargaining is equal for different ownership struc-
tures (r).
Table 8 gives an overview of the average lengths of bargaining games. It shows
that participants in the SOS-experiment on average reached agreements earlier than
participants in our basic treatment. They also have shorter bargaining processes than
participants in our auction treatment. Ownership structures hardly play any role at
all. There is just one case where r makes a difference: In periods 10 - 18 in the auction
treatment the average bargaining length in case of r = 7, 800 is significantly (5% and
10%, respectively) shorter than in case of r = 1, 800 and r = 6, 800, respectively. Learn-
ing effects do not seem to play an important role as there is no significant difference
between the first and the second half of the experiments.
The fact that in SOS and in both of our treatments agreement is reached only after 2-
3 rounds is inconsistent with subgame perfection that predicts immediate agreement.
This is reinforced by the fact that there are 26 cases in total (13 cases in each treatment)
in which agreement is not reached at all. Inefficiencies in alternating offers bargain-
ing experiments are not at all a rare exception.8 Consequently, bargaining behavior
in our experiment is in line with experimental bargaining literature. Summing up, al-
though subgame perfectness provides a workable prediction of the distribution of final
agreements it fails to explain bargaining inefficiencies. Consequently, we submit that a
8See e.g. Camerer (2003, pp. 161-67), Sonnemans et al. (2001, p. 814).
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workable theory of incomplete contracts must take into account all kinds of bargaining
costs to get a deeper understanding of the reasons of real behavior.
Result 10. In the basic treatment investment behavior differs substantially from ’optimal’ in-
vestments for each value of r. However, if the effect of r is neglected, average investments are
close to ’optimal’ investments.
Like Sonnemans et al. (2001) we estimate the investor’s profit function. Given the
estimated profit function it is possible to derive ’optimal’ investments and compare
these values to actual average investments. In contrast to SOS we do not use the in-
vestor’s fictive profits that he would have earned if he had taken M2’s first offer. We
think that the use of such fictive values neglects strategic bargaining behavior by the
investor and bargaining inefficiencies.9 Our approach uses the investor’s realized prof-
its. The estimated equation is pi = β0 + β1i + β2i2 + e. The results of our estimation
for the basic treatment are given in Table 9.
TABLE 9. Regression results estimating the investor’s profit function in
the basic treatment
deviation
r Constant i i2 n Adj. R2 iˆ∗ mean i (# of std. err.)
1,800 4741.36 6.609 -0.011 114 0.12 312 238 3
(279) (1.94) (0.003) (33.14)
6,800 7485.91 1.906 -0.0068 114 0.36 141 370 3
(349) (1.76)# (0.002) (91.21)
7,800 8310.43 1.852 -0.008 114 0.65 121 417 5
(262) (1.24)# (0.001) (61.10)
All 5762.68 8.045 -0.012 342 0.19 339 342 1
(219) (1.20) (0.001) (17.52)
Standard errors in parentheses. If a standard error is marked with ”#” then the coeffi-
cient is not significantly different from zero at the 5%-level. All other coefficients are
significant at the 5%-level.
9Nevertheless, our estimates using realized profits lead to the same qualitative results we get using
fictive profits for both treatments (see Appendix A).
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Irrespective of the value of r the difference between iˆ∗ and i is rather large and ranges
from within 3 up to within 5 standard errors of estimated iˆ∗. This indicates that invest-
ment behavior is not optimally adapted to the different ownership structures. This re-
sult is inconsistent with the findings of SOS who find only limited deviations from ’op-
timal’ investments, i.e. deviations within 1 (r = 1, 800), 2 (r = 7, 800), and 3 (r = 6, 800)
standard errors.
Surprisingly, however, ’optimal’ investments are close to average investments if we
base our optimization on an estimation that ignores the impact of r. The deviation be-
tween our estimated iˆ∗ and mean i is within 1 standard error of iˆ∗. Our interpretation
of this finding is that subjects in our experiment do have learned to adapt their invest-
ment level in general but do not have learned to adapt the investments to different
ownership structures!
Result 11. Investment behavior in the auction treatment is close to ’optimal’ investment be-
havior.
As before, we estimate investor’s profits10 as a function of i and i2, calculate M1’s
optimal investments and analyze the deviation of ’optimal’ investment from the mean
of real investment behavior. In Table 10 we give the results of regression estimates for
all periods and for periods 10-18.
In seven out of eight estimations mean investments are within one standard devia-
tion of the estimated optimal investment iˆ∗. The only remaining case, r = 7, 800 in pe-
riods 10-18, lies within two standard deviations. However, the 1-standard-deviation-
zone is missed only slightly. Consequently, investment behavior is much closer to opti-
mal investment behavior than in SOS and in our basic treatment. However, we should
mention that the regressions for r = 1, 800 are dissatisfactory and it is only the large
standard deviation of estimated optimal investments that keeps the distance within
the zone.
10We used profits gross of auction costs as the dependent variable because at the time of investment
auction costs are already sunk and irrelevant for investment decisions. However, we also estimated
net profits and it showed that in this case the corresponding ’optimal’ investments were even closer to
average investments. Accordingly, the results presented here are rather conservative.
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TABLE 10. Regression results estimating the investor’s profit in the auc-
tion treatment
deviation
r C i i2 n Adj. R2 iˆ∗ mean i (# of std. err.)
All Periods
1,800 4497.36 1.965 -0.0023 79 -0.01 430 251 1
(349) (2.15)# (0.003)# (253)
6,800 7542.71 4.782 -0.0085 177 0.14 280 300 1
(232) (1.36) (0.0018) (32.89)
7,800 8295.75 6.766 -0.0139 86 0.56 244 262 1
(213) (1.29) (0.0016) (23.19)
All 6898.98 5.380 -0.0092 342 0.08 293 279 1
(226) (1.346) (0.0018) (30.57)
Periods 10-18
1,800 4555.63 3.653 -0.0073 36 -0.03 251 255 1
(504) (3.977)# (0.007)# (93.31)
6,800 7946.67 2.738 -0.0061 84 0.10 224 294 1
(330) (1.888)# (0.0025) (79.13)
7,800 8541.32 4.193 -0.0089 51 0.38 237 294 2
(279) (1.656) (0.0021) (45.57)
All 7342.44 3.043 -0.0059 171 0.03 258 286 1
(328) (1.948) (0.0026) (73.76)
Standard errors in parentheses. If a standard error is marked with ”#” then the coeffi-
cient is not significantly different from zero at the 5%-level. All other coefficients are
significant at the 5%-level.
Note that optimal investments are remarkably close to equilibrium investments (250)
in the final 9 periods. For these cases we find the largest deviation to be 26 investment
points which is very little compared to the basic treatment. Furthermore, equilibrium
investments of 250 are within one standard deviation of the estimated optimal invest-
ments in all but one cases.
Investment behavior in our auction treatment thus is strikingly different from in-
vestment behavior in both our basic treatment and the corresponding treatment in
SOS. SOS and the basic treatment report higher investment levels for exogenous prop-
erty rights. Note that ownership rights give bargaining power to the investor and that
the investors invest more if this bargaining advantage is not ”earned”. But why are
investors more ”generous” when they get ownership rights as a gift?
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One possible explanation for this is that fairness considerations play a role. If
there exists something like inequality aversion (see e.g. Fehr/Schmidt (1999) and
Bolton/Ockenfels (2000)) then investors may invest more than subgame perfectness
predicts in order to get a more equal distribution of profits. However, if investors have
to buy ownership rights by winning an auction they do regard their bargaining power
as something they have earned and have spent money on. Consequently, taking into
account ownership costs, there is not as much comparative advantage of owning the
assets which leads to amore selfish investment behavior of inequality averse subjects.11
5. CONCLUSION
In the preceding section we compared experimental data of our basic treatment with
that of SOS’s TP-game. Comparing these two experiments in which ownership struc-
tures are exogenous we get the following results:
• In both treatments investments increase with r.
• In our basic treatment investments are generally lower than in SOS.
• In both treatments investments are in between the socially optimal level and the
equilibrium level for r = 6, 800 and r = 7, 800. For r = 1, 800 this is also true in
SOS, but not in our basic treatment.
• In both treatments finally agreed offers are in between the equilibrium values
of the outside option-bargaining game and the subgame perfect equilibrium of
our bargaining game, i.e. the Nash Bargaining solution. In both treatments
finally agreed offers are closer to the Nash Bargaining solution.
• In both treatments finally agreed offers (higher no-trade payoffs) give the in-
vestor a larger (smaller) return on investment than theory predicts.
• In both treatments agreement is not reached immediately and the average
length of the bargaining process is independent of the ownership structure.
However, in our basic treatment on average bargaining took more time than
in SOS.
11We think that arguments that solely rest on reciprocity do not work as well here. First, (positive)
reciprocity should still be possible even if subjects have to buy assets. Second, among others Char-
ness/Rabin (2002) have shown that positive reciprocity is less widespread than negative reciprocity
which means that arguments based on positive reciprocity should be taken with some care.
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• Investment behavior in our basic treatment differs substantially from estimated
’optimal’ investment. This is true for all values of r and for fictive and actual
profits. This is inconsistent with the findings of SOS. However, if ’optimal’ in-
vestment is estimated neglecting the impact of r then average investments are
close to ’optimal’ investments.
In our basic treatment most results of SOS can be replicated. We suspect that the
remaining differences between SOS and our basic treatment can at least partially be
explained by their different definition of the base amount V. In SOS V = 10, 000+ r, so
that the costs of delaying agreement are higher encouraging earlier agreements. This,
in turn, increases investment incentives which seem to be particularly low in our basic
treatment with r-values of 6,800 and 7,800. Summarizing, we believe that our results,
by and large, confirm those of SOS.
The central question of this paper, however, is whether introducing endogenous
ownership structures influences subjects’ behavior. The main deviations of behavior
in the auction treatment from behavior in the basic treatment are:
• Mean investment do not increase in r anymore.
• Average investments are much closer to equilibrium predictions based on sub-
game perfectness. In most cases we cannot reject the hypothesis that equilib-
rium investments are the mean of laboratory investments.
• Finally agreed distributions of payoffs are very close to the equilibrium predic-
tion. In neither case can we reject the hypothesis that the equilibrium distribu-
tion of the Nash-share (50%) is the mean of our subsamples of Nash-shares.
• The impact of r on finally agreed offers is close to theoretical predictions.
• Investment decisions are close to ’optimal’ investments.
The most important parallels between our two treatments are:
• Finally agreed offers give the investor a larger return on investments than pre-
dicted by theory.
• In contrast to theory, bargaining is inefficient, i.e. agreement is usually not
reached immediately.
• The average length of the bargaining process is, by and large, independent of r.
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We think these results are evidence for the hypothesis that it makes a huge difference
whether the ownership structure in hold up-experiments is assigned exogenously or
determined endogenously. This is quite important because asset ownership in real life
business is almost always endogenous, too. In general, endogenizing asset ownership
moves behavior further towards standard theory. Sonnemans et al. (2001) conclude
that their results ”support the theory in a relative sense”. We believe, our evidence
shows that making asset ownership endogenous supports theory even more. In this
sense, our data show that Property Rights Theory has indeed a solid empirical basis.
Furthermore, we submit that there is good reason to endogenize endowments and
positions in economic experiments much more often than is common by now. Hoff-
man/Spitzer (1982), Hoffman/Spitzer (1985) and Hoffman et al. (1994) showed that
entitlements to positions have significant effects on behavior. If this assumption of en-
dogeny is both the rule in business life and relevant for behavior we should not neglect
it in experimental designs.
However, important caveats remain. In particular, the assumption of efficient bar-
gaining is clearly violated in SOS’s as well as in our experiment. We have to admit,
though, that the type of alternating offers bargaining games we and SOS used overem-
phasizes the aspect of bargaining costs because every single rejection of an offer leads
to immediate substantial losses. Real bargaining situations in business typically in-
volve comparatively smaller costs of delay than in our experiments.
The Nash Bargaining solution seems to describe the final distribution of payoffs
rather well. Having this in mind it is even more surprising that regressions on fi-
nally agreed offers show that investors get a larger return on their investments than
predicted. We do not yet have an explanation for this.
There are numerous open questions for future research. First of all, we believe that
there is a need to clarify the role of the bargaining game. In particular, we wonder
whether unstructured bargaining processes with lower costs of delay may lead to dif-
ferent magnitudes of investment. Second, most experiments we know of use only
one-sided investment. There is some evidence that underinvestment decreases in sit-
uations of bilateral investments. Third, we should test experimental designs in which
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asset ownership alters marginal investment incentives. Finally, all this should be real-
ized with endogenous asset ownership, of course.
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APPENDIX A. REGRESSION RESULTS USING SOS’S FICTIVE PROFIT’S SUGGESTION
The following tables show the results estimating the investor’s fictive profit funktion
in both treatments assuming that the investor accepted the first offer the non-investor
made. As can be easily seen the results are qualitatively in accordance with the results
estimating the investor’s real profits (gross of auction costs).
TABLE 11. Regression results estimating the investor’s fictive profit
function in the basic treatment
deviation
r Constant i i2 n Adj. R2 iˆ∗ mean i (# of std. err.)
1,800 4698.54 9.335 -0.015 114 0.26 306 238 4
(261) (1.82) (0.002) (21.77)
6,800 6585.14 2.180 -0.0042 114 0.08 260 370 2
(338) (1.704)# (0.002) (95.24)
7,800 7115.76 5.172 -0.010 114 0.49 254 417 5
(322) (1.520) (0.002) (37.66)
All 5439.78 8.309 -0.012 342 0.21 359 342 2
(196) (1.07) (0.001) (15.28)
Standard errors in parentheses. If a standard error is marked with ”#” then the coeffi-
cient is not significantly different from zero at the 5%-level. All other coefficients are
significant at the 5%-level. The correlation between the non-investor’s first offer and
the agreed on offer is 85.8%.
TABLE 12. Regression results estimating the investor’s fictive profit
function (gross of auction costs) in the auction treatment
deviation
r Constant i i2 n Adj. R2 iˆ∗ mean i (# of std. err.)
1,800 4197.40 1.000 -0.0002 79 -0.01 3106 251 1
(345) (2.13)# (0.003)# (51964.82)
6,800 6644.44 6.794 -0.0117 177 0.17 290 300 1
(284) (1.66) (0.0022) (28.49)
7,800 7360.45 4.575 -0.0073 86 0.06 314 262 1
(352) (2.13) (0.0027) (61.16)
All 6201.99 5.041 -0.0078 342 0.05 323 279 2
(236) (1.406) (0.0019) (35.72)
Standard errors in parentheses. If a standard error is marked with ”#” then the coeffi-
cient is not significantly different from zero at the 5%-level. All other coefficients are
significant at the 5%-level. The correlation between the non-investor’s first offer and
the agreed on offer is 77.4%.
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APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTIONS – BASIC TREATMENT
At the beginning of the experiment you are informed about your role you keep during the whole
experiment. You are assigned either the role of a participant A or the role of a participant B.
You will keep this role for the whole experiment. Furthermore you receive at the beginning of
the experiment your initial endowment of experimental points. Participants with the role of A
receive 10,000 points, participants with the role of B receive 60,000 points.
The experiment comprises 18 periods. Each single period consists of two stages. Whereas
Stage I is not divided Stage II is divided in 10 rounds. At the beginning of each period
the participants are grouped. Each single group consists of one participant with the role of
A and one participant with the role of B. The grouping was determined before the start of the
experiment. It was done such that it is impossible that you are grouped with the same participant
in two successive periods. Moreover, you will be grouped with the same participant at most
twice during the whole experiment. When you will be grouped with the same participant is not
predictable. During one period you will stay together with that same participant. You are not
informed about who this other participant is.
Each single period of this experiment is structured in the following way. At the beginning of
each period both participants of a group are informed about the individual base amounts that
apply in that period. Only one of the following combinations X, Y, and Z are possible:
Combination X Y Z
Base amount of participant A 1,800 6,800 7,800
Base amount of participant B 0 0 0
Which combination is in effect in a particular period is determined by the main computer draw-
ing a random number at the beginning of each period. The random number is drawn such that
each of the three combinations has equal probability of 13 of being chosen. On average com-
bination X will be in effect in 6 out of 18 periods, combination Y in 6 out of 18 periods, and
combination Z in 6 out of 18 periods. However, this applies only on average. The probabil-
ity that a special combination will be in effect in the following period is independent of the
respective combinations in previous periods and will again be 13 .
When both participants are informed about the combination of the current period the period
actually starts. In the first stage of the period only participant A makes a decision. In the second
stage of the period both participants of a group make decisions. In detail, the stages of each
single period have the following structure:
Stage I: Participant A chooses an amount T. T has to be a multiple of 10 and has to lie in
between 0 and 1,000. The sum of amount T and 1,000 points make the round pie. When A has
chosen B is informed about the amount T. By choosing T only participant A has to bear costs
amounting to (T/10)2. In the table that is handed out to you you find for every possible amount
T the exact costs participant A has to bear. Please note that the chosen amount T is in effect in
every single round of stage III. When participant A chooses amount T every single round-pie of
stage III increases by T. The costs for amount T, however, incur only once in stage I.
Stage II: In stage II A and B have 10 bargaining rounds to agree on a division of the round-pies.
Participant B always makes the first proposal, i.e. in round 1, how to divide the round-pies.
Participant A can accept that offer or refuse it. When A accepts the offer the bargaining and the
period end. In case of refusal the right to make an offer changes sides for the following round.
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Thus, in round 2 participant A makes a proposal on the division of the round-pies. Again,
participant B can accept or refuse that offer. In case of acceptance the bargaining and the period
end. In case B refuses the right to make an offer again changes sides for the next round. This
scheme is repeated until an offer is accepted or the end of round 10 has come. When a proposal
on division of the round-pies is accepted in some round the current and all remaining round-pies
are divided according to the accepted offer. When a proposal is refused both participants only
receive their individual base amounts.
STRUCTURE OF THE EXPERIMENT
 ExECUTe, Technische Universität Clausthal  
   
Experiment am 12. Juni 2003  Seite 2/2 
Stufe I: Teilnehmer A wählt einen Betrag T aus. Dieser muss ein Vielfaches von 10 sein 
und zwischen 0 und 1.000 liegen. Die Summe aus dem Betrag T und 1.000 
Experimentalpunkten ergibt den Rundenbetrag. Wenn A ihre/seine Entscheidung 
getroffen hat, wird B über die Höhe von T informiert. Durch die Wahl von T 
entstehen ausschließlich Teilnehmer A Kosten. Diese belaufen sich auf (T/10)2. In 
der Tabelle, die Ihnen ebenfalls ausgehändigt wird, finden Sie für jeden möglichen 
Betrag T die exakten Kosten für Teilnehmer A für diesen Betrag. Denken Sie daran, 
dass der gewählte Betrag T in jeder der 10 Runden von Stufe II Gültigkeit hat; wenn 
also Teilnehmer A den Betrag T wählt, erhöht sich jeder der zehn Rundenbeträge, 
die in Stufe II aufgeteilt werden können, um T. Die Kosten für Betrag T fallen 
jedoch nur einmal pro Periode an. 
 
Stufe II: In Stufe II stehen A und B 10 Verhandlungsrunden zur Verfügung, um eine 
Einigung über die Aufteilung der Rundenbeträge zu erzielen. Teilnehmer B macht 
immer den ersten Vorschlag (d.h. in Runde 1), wie die Rundenbeträge aufgeteilt 
werden sollen. Teilnehmer A kann diesen Vorschlag annehmen oder ablehnen. Im 
Fall einer Annahme endet die Verhandlung und die Periode. Im Fall einer 
Ablehnung wechselt für die folgende Runde das Vorschlagsrecht. In Runde 2 macht 
somit Teilnehmer A einen Vorschlag. Diesen kann B annehmen oder ablehnen. 
Nimmt B an, endet die Verhandlung und die Periode. Lehnt B ab, erfolgt wiederum 
ein Wechsel des Vorschlagsrechts für die nächste Runde. Diese Schema wiederholt 
sich solange, bis ein Vorschlag akzeptiert wird oder wenn das Ende der zehnten 
Runde erreicht ist. Wird in einer Runde ein Vorschlag akzeptiert, dann werden der 
laufend  un  alle verbleibenden Rundenbeträge gemäß dem akzeptierten Vorsc lag 
aufgeteilt. Wird in e ner Rund  d r Vorschlag abgele nt, e halten beide Teilnehmer 
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  Stage I  Participant A chooses amount T 
       
       
       
   Stage II  Round 1 B makes a proposal 
    ? (Round 2 A makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 3 B makes a proposal) 
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    ? (Round 6 A makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 7 B makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 8 A makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 9 B makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 10 A makes a proposal) 
       









APPENDIX C. SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTIONS – AUCTION TREATMENT
At the beginning of the experiment you are informed about your role you keep during the whole
experiment. You are assigned either the role of a participant A or the role of a participant B.
You will keep this role for the whole experiment. Furthermore you receive at the beginning of
the experiment your initial endowment of experimental points. Participants with the role of A
receive 20,000 points, participants with the role of B receive 70,000 points.
The experiment comprises 18 periods. Each single period consists of three stages. Stage I
is divided in two auctions. Stage II is not divided, and stage III is divided in 10 rounds.
At the beginning of each period the participants are grouped. Each single group consists of
one participant with the role of A and one participant with the role of B. The grouping was
determined before the start of the experiment. It was done such that it is impossible that you are
grouped with the same participant in two successive periods. Moreover, you will be grouped
with the same participant at most twice during the whole experiment. When you will be grouped
with the same participant is not predictable. During one period you will stay together with that
same participant. You are not informed about who this other participant is.
Each single period of this experiment is structured in the following way:
Stage I: In stage I both you and the participant with whom you are grouped participate in two
successive auctions. The outcomes of these auctions determine the individual base amounts
that are used in stage III of the period. Only one of the following combinations X, Y, and Z are
possible:
Combination X Y Z
Base amount participant A 1,800 6,800 7,800









Combination X of the individual base amounts is in effect when participant B of a group wins
both auctions. Combination Y is in effect when participant A of a group wins one auction
and looses the other one. Combination Z is in effect when participant A of a group wins both
auctions.
Stage II: Participant A chooses an amount T. T has to be a multiple of 10 and has to lie in
between 0 and 1,000. The sum of amount T and 1,000 points make the round pie. When A has
chosen B is informed about the amount T. By choosing T only participant A has to bear costs
amounting to (T/10)2. In the table that is handed out to you you find for every possible amount
T the exact costs participant A has to bear. Please note that the chosen amount T is in effect in
every single round of stage III. When participant A chooses amount T every single round-pie of
stage III increases by T. The costs for amount T, however, incur only once in stage I.
Stage III: In stage III A and B have 10 bargaining rounds to agree on a division of the round-
pies. Participant B always makes the first proposal, i.e. in round 1, how to divide the round-
pies. Participant A can accept that offer or refuse it. When A accepts the offer the bargaining
and the period end. In case of refusal the right to make an offer changes sides for the following
round. Thus, in round 2 participant A makes a proposal on the division of the round-pies. Again,
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participant B can accept or refuse that offer. In case of acceptance the bargaining and the period
end. In case B refuses the right to make an offer again changes sides for the next round. This
scheme is repeated until an offer is accepted or the end of round 10 has come. When a proposal
on division of the round-pies is accepted in some round the current and all remaining round-pies
are divided according to the accepted offer. When a proposal is refused both participants only
receive their individual base amounts that were determined in the auctions of stage I.
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Betrag T die exakten Kosten für Teilnehmer A für diesen Betrag. Denken Sie 
daran, dass der gewählte Betrag T in jeder der 10 Runden von Stufe III Gültigkeit 
hat; wenn also Teilnehmer A den Betrag T wählt, erhöht sich jeder der zehn 
Rundenbeträge, die in Stufe III aufgeteilt werden können, um T. Die Kosten für 
Betrag T fallen jedoch nur einmal pro Periode an. 
 
Stufe III: In Stufe III stehen A und B 10 Verhandlungsrunden zur Verfügung, um eine 
Einigung über die Aufteilung der Rundenbeträge zu erzielen. Teilnehmer B macht 
immer den ersten Vorschlag (d.h. in Runde 1), wie die Rundenbeträge aufgeteilt 
werden sollen. Teilnehmer A kann diesen Vorschlag annehmen oder ablehnen. Im 
Fall einer Annahme endet die Verhandlung und die Periode. Im Fall einer 
Ablehnung wechselt für die folgende Runde das Vorschlagsrecht. In Runde 2 
macht somit Teilnehmer A einen Vorschlag. Diesen kann B annehmen oder 
ablehnen. Nimmt B an, endet die Verhandlung und die Periode. Lehnt B ab, erfolgt 
wiederum ein Wechsel des Vorschlagsrechts für die nächste Runde. Dieses 
Schema wiederholt sich solange, bis ein Vorschlag akzeptiert wird oder wenn das 
Ende der z hnten Runde erreicht ist. Wird in einer Runde ein Vorschlag akzeptiert, 
dann werden der laufende und alle verbleibenden Rundenbeträge gemäß dem 
akzeptierten Vorschlag aufgeteilt. Wird in einer Runde der Vorschlag abgelehnt, 
erhalten beide Teilnehmer für die laufende Runde nur ihre individuellen 
Basisbeträge, deren Höhe durch die Auktionen in Stufe I festgelegt wurde. 
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 Auction 2 
       
      
      
 
  Stage II  Participant A chooses amount T 
       
       
       
   Stage III  Round 1 B makes a proposal 
 Period   ? (Round 2 A makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 3 B makes a proposal) 
 
 
  ? (Round 4 A makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 5 B makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 6 A makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 7 B makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 8 A makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 9 B makes a proposal) 
    ? (Round 10 A makes a proposal) 
       









Determination of the 
individual base amounts 
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